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Abstract
We show that three location models on the Salop circle, involving
linear or quadratic transport cost, and asymmetric locations or xed
benets, are equivalent: they lead to the same demand functions and
consumer surplus. The only exception is the case of asymmetric lo-
cations with an even number of rms, which has one less degree of
freedom. These models are also fully equivalent to a normative rep-
resentative consumer whose indirect utility is given by the standard
Salop consumer surplus. This result provides a further unication of
location and representative consumer models.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we compare three types of circular-city Salop models, all of
which are generalizations of the original model of Salop (1979). These models
contain a di¤erent mix of assumptions about transport cost, locations and
xed benets:
 linear transport cost, symmetric locations, and asymmetric xed ben-
et to consumers;
 quadratic transport cost, symmetric locations, and asymmetric xed
benet to consumers;
 linear transport cost, asymmetric locations, and symmetric xed ben-
et to consumers;1
It is well-known that the rst two models, with linear and quadratic trans-
port costs, both lead to linear demand functions. Thus they are equivalent
from this restricted (positive) point of view. But are the implied expres-
sions for consumer surplus comparable in any way? In other words, while
the models are equivalent at a descriptive level, are they also equivalent at a
normative level? This seems rather unlikely, given that functional forms of
transport costs are so di¤erent.
On the other hand, it seems at rst sight that a model with asymmetric
locations leads to demand functions and consumer surplus that are again
rather di¤erent from those in a model with symmetric locations and asym-
metric benets. Thus the latter model appears to be both descriptively and
normatively di¤erent.
The rst purpose of this paper is to show that these three Salop models
are indeed both descriptively and normatively equivalent for a given set of
locations. We derive a common expression for consumer surplus and show
how these models map bijectively into each other. There is one exception,
though: For an even number of rms, the model with asymmetric locations
has one degree of freedom less than the other models discussed here.
The main practical lesson one can draw from these equivalences is that
the informational content of these three models is the same (up to the caveat
just mentioned); and that one can use the formulation which responds better
to ones modeling aims. In particular, some formulation may lead to simpler
expressions depending on the context in which the model is applied. What
will di¤er, though are the comparative statics with respect to fundamental
1With some more notation, the latter case can be extended to asymmetric xed benets,
too. Our point in the paper is to show how xed benets and locations map into each.
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market parameters such as benets or locations: Changing benets of one
single rm, for example, maps into global changes in locations, and vice versa.
On a somewhat deeper level, our result is a useful step towards unifying
the "zoo" of available models for applied work. It is often a concern that
the results of the modeling exercise might not be robust to how exactly the
underlying market model is specied. Here we show when the choice between
the three models discussed in this paper does not matter.
The second main point of the paper is that the standard Salop consumer
surplus, made up of consumption utility minus "transport cost", represents
a valid (quasi-linear) indirect utility function of a representative consumer.
Thus, following the concepts discussed in Mas-Colell et al. (1995, ch. 4),
consumer surplus portrays a normative representative consumer: Not only
can aggregate demand be derived from maximizing his utility (this would
be a positive representative consumer), but this single consumers surplus
can be used for welfare evaluation.2 Thus apart from having shown that the
above three Salop location models are equivalent to each other, they are also
all fully equivalent to a specic representative consumer model, providing a
further unication of location and representative consumer models.
Anderson et al. (1992, ch. 5) provide a random utility formulation for
the Hotelling duopoly model and derive a (direct) utility function from which
the standard Hotelling demand can be determined. That is, they construct
a positive representative consumer for the Hotelling model. Still, they make
no attempt to show that this utility is in any way related to the standard
consumer surplus in the Hotelling model, nor that their utility can lead to
a valid representation of aggregate welfare. In our paper we show that for
the Salop model the standard consumer surplus contains such a valid repre-
sentation. It would be a simple exercise to show the corresponding result for
the Hotelling model following the procedure in our paper.
As a last step we also point out that the Salop model with asymmetric
locations and quadratic transport cost is not equivalent to the three models
discussed before. The main reason for this is that the quadratic transport
cost formulation makes the asymmetric location parameters appear in the
slopes of the demand function, so that every rm potentially has a di¤erent
slope of demand for each of its own and neighborsprices. This is ruled out
in the above models, and thus indicates that their equivalence is not at all
obvious.
2The latter holds true because a quasi-linear indirect utility is automatically of the
Gorman form, which allows this aggregation without having to worry about how welfare
of individual consumers is weighted.
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2 Example: The Hotelling Model
The Hotelling model (Hotelling, 1929) and its reformulation by dAspremont
et al. (1979) are widely used building blocks for applied work. Two rms
are located at the opposite ends of line of length 1, over which a mass 1 of
consumers is uniformly distributed. The location x 2 [0; 1] of each consumer
indicates his ideal variety, consumption of which yields him a utility of v. If
he buys from rm 1 at location 0, or rm 2 at location 1, then he su¤ers
a disutility ("linear transport cost") of tx, or t (1  x), respectively, where
t > 0. DAspremont et al. changed this formulation to a quadratic transport
tx2, or t (1  x)2.3 Given prices p1 and p2 for the rmsgoods, the market
will divide at the indi¤erent customers y and ~y given by (utility is assumed
to be quasi-linear in money)
v   p1   ty = v   p2   t (1  y)() y = 1
2
+
p2   p1
2t
v   p1   t~y2 = v   p2   t (1  ~y)2 () ~y = 1
2
+
p2   p1
2t
:
Thus from a descriptive perspective both models are identical: They lead to
the same demand functions. Let us compare consumer surplus:
CS = v   yp1   (1  y) p2  
Z y
0
txdx 
Z 1 y
0
txdx;
fCS = v   ~yp1   (1  ~y) p2   Z ~y
0
tx2dx 
Z 1 ~y
0
tx2dx:
These terms di¤er in transport cost. Surely, CS will be quadratic in prices,
and fCS of third order? Actually, after some simplications we obtain
CS = v   p1 + p2
2
+
(p1   p2)2
4t
  1
4
t;
fCS = v   p1 + p2
2
+
(p1   p2)2
4t
  1
12
t;
i.e. the two consumer surplus measures only di¤er in a constant. Moreover,
this consumer surplus is a valid indirect utility function for a representative
consumer, as can be shown by applying Roys identity:
 @CS
@p1
=  @
fCS
@p1
=
1
2
+
p2   p1
2t
= y = ~y:
3They did this to avoid discontinuities in demand that occur when rms locate closer
to each other. This issue will play no role in the present paper.
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We have thus shown the following: For xed locations at the extremes of the
Hotelling lines, the Hotelling models with linear and quadratic transport costs
are equivalent to each other, both from a positive (demand) and normative
(consumer surplus) point of view. Furthermore, the standard expressions for
consumer surplus in these discrete choice models can be interpreted equiva-
lently as the indirect utility of a representative consumer. Below we follow
the same procedure for the di¤erent variants of the Salop model mentioned
above.
3 Three Equivalent SalopModels, and a Black
Sheep
In the following we derive the demand function and corresponding consumer
surplus for each of the three models. We show that this consumer surplus
can be interpreted as providing the indirect utility (and thus the preferences)
of a representative consumer. All longer proofs have been relegated to an
Appendix.
3.1 Linear Transport Cost and Asymmetric Benets
We rst present the Salop model with symmetric locations and asymmetric
benets because it is the simplest to deal with.
A set of n > 0 rms k 2 f1; :::; ng are located symmetrically at locations
(k   1) =n on a circle of circumference 1. For notational convenience, we
identify rms k 2 Z outside this range with rm ((k   1) modn) + 1, e.g.
rms 0 and n+ 1 are identied with rms n and 1, respectively.
We also assume that a mass 1 of consumers is located uniformly around
the circle. Each consumers location describes his ideal good, and he su¤ers
a disutility or "transport cost" td from buying the good at a rm at distance
d  0 along the circle, where the parameter t > 0 measures the strength of
preferences.
A consumer buying from rm k obtains surplus (before transport cost) of
wk = k   pk;
where k > 0 is an idiosyncratic benet from consuming rm ks good, and
pk is rm ks price.
Here and in the following we will assume that prices pk are low enough as
compared to xed surplus k so that all consumers are willing to buy from
some rm. In applications this will usually be guaranteed by enough compe-
tition between neighboring rms. Furthermore, we assume that asymmetries
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are weak enough so that no rm is excluded from the market; this implies
that each rm competes directly only with its two neighbors.4
In order to nd rm ks demand, we follow the standard steps of rst
deriving the locations of the consumers that are indi¤erent between its of-
fer and that of its neighbors, and then determining the mass of consumers
between these indi¤erent consumers. Denote by xk the location of the indif-
ferent consumer between rms k and k+ 1 relative to the location of rm k,
i.e. xk 2 [0; 1=n]. Then his location is given by the indi¤erence condition
wk   txk = wk+1   t

1
n
  xk

;
and consequently
xk =
1
2n
+
wk   wk+1
2t
:
The demand qk of rm k is given by a mass of xk consumers on its right and 
1
n
  xk 1

on its left, or
qk = xk +

1
n
  xk 1

=
1
n
+
2wk   wk+1   wk 1
2t
(1)
The consumer surplus in the Salop model is given by the sum of consumption
benets minus aggregate transport cost, as
CS =
nX
k=1
 
wkqk  
Z xk
0
txdx 
Z 1=n xk 1
0
txdx
!
(2)
We now restate this consumer surplus in a rather simpler form:
Proposition 1 Consumer surplus in the n-rm Salop model with linear
transport cost, symmetric locations and asymmetric xed benets can be
stated as
CS =
nX
k=1
 
sk
n
+
(sk   sk+1)2
4t
!
;
where
sk = k   pk  
t
4n
:
4See Hoernig (2014) for a generalized Hotelling model where each rms directly com-
petes with all other rms in the market.
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Interpreting this consumer surplus as a quasi-linear indirect utility func-
tion of a representative consumer, as in (let p = (p1; :::; pn) be the vector of
prices)
v (p; w) = w + CS;
we can apply Roys Lemma:
qk =  @v (p; w)
@pk

@v (p; w)
@w
=  @CS
@pk
=   @
@pk
 
sk
n
+
(sk   sk+1)2
4t
+
(sk   sk 1)2
4t
!
=
1
n
+
2wk   wk+1   wk 1
2t
This faithfully reproduces the demand function (1). Since an indirect utility
function contains the same information about a consumer as a direct util-
ity function over consumption bundles, consumer surplus (2) represents the
preferences of a normative representative consumer, as dened by Mas-Colell
et al. (1995)
3.2 Quadratic Transport Costs and Asymmetric Ben-
ets
Now we change the denition of transport from linear (td) to quadratic, d2
with  > 0. As we will see immediately, for the purpose of comparison it
is very useful to write the transport cost parameter as  = nt. Otherwise
the model remains identical to the above linear specication. The indi¤erent
consumer between rms k and k + 1 is given by
wk   x2k = wk+1    (1=n  xk)2 ;
i.e.
xk =
1
2n
+
n (wk   wk+1)
2
=
1
2n
+
wk   wk+1
2t
:
As above, rm ks demand is determined as
qk = xk +

1
n
  xk 1

=
1
n
+
2wk   wk+1   wk 1
2t
:
We see that the expressions for the indi¤erent consumers and demands are
identical to those we found above.
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The denition of consumer surplus now must take into account that trans-
port costs are quadratic:
CS =
nX
k=1
 
wkqk  
Z xk
0
x2dx 
Z 1=n xk 1
0
x2dx
!
This expression contains cubic terms and therefore it seems at rst sight that
it cannot possibly coincide with consumer surplus (2) in the linear case. We
show that it actually only di¤ers by a constant:5
Proposition 2 Consumer surplus in the n-rm Salop model with quadratic
transport cost, symmetric locations and asymmetric xed benets can be
stated as
CS =
nX
k=1
 
~sk
n
+
(~sk   ~sk+1)2
4t
!
;
where
~sk = k   pk  
t
12n
:
Again Roys lemma applies:6
 @CS
@pk
=
1
n
+
~sk   ~sk+1
2t
+
~sk   ~sk 1
4t
=
1
n
+
2wk   wk+1   wk 1
2t
= qk:
Thus, contrary to what one might expect, the Salop models with linear and
quadratic transport costs are perfectly equivalent to each other. The only
necessary change is a shift in xed consumer surplus so that
~sk = sk +

t
4n
  t
12n

= sk +
t
6n
;
implying the same constant di¤erence in aggregate consumer surplus of t=6n.
5One can actually show that this equivalence holds in similar form for higher powers
in the transport cost function: Consumer surplus for transport costs tdm and dm+1 are
equivalent whenever m is an odd integer (i.e., the terms of power m+ 1 cancel).
6Now that we know that consumer surplus also in this case is just a quadratic and not
a cubic function of individual consumerssurplus, this is to be expected.
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3.3 Linear Transport Cost and Asymmetric Locations
In this section we set out the Salop model with asymmetric locations. In
order to focus on how location asymmetry maps into asymmetric benets
under symmetric locations, we assume that consumers xed benets are
symmetric.
Firm k is located at (k   1) =n + k, where the jkj are small enough so
that the order of rms on the circle does not change and that consumers
still choose between their two neighboring rms. The individual consumers
surplus from choosing rm k is given by vk = v pk. We dene the indi¤erent
consumers location as relative to (k   1) =n as above, so that this time it is
given by
vk   t (xk   k) = vk+1   t

1
n
+ k+1   xk

;
or
xk =
1
2n
+
k + k+1
2
+
vk   vk+1
2t
:
The demand of rm k is given by
qk = xk +

1
n
  xk 1

=
1
n
+
k+1   k 1
2
+
2vk   vk 1   vk+1
2t
:
Both expressions indicate that immediately mapping them into (1) is more
di¢ cult than in the previous case.
Consumer surplus is again dened as the sum of benets minus transport
costs, taking into account now the specic locations of individual rms:
CS =
nX
k=1
 
vkqk  
Z xk
k
t (x  k) dx 
Z 1=n xk 1
 k
t (x+ k) dx
!
:
In the Appendix, we show the following:
Proposition 3 Consumer surplus in the n-rm Salop model with linear
transport cost, asymmetric locations and symmetric xed benets can be
stated as
CS =
nX
k=1
 
s^k
n
+
(s^k   s^k+1)2
4t
!
;
where
s^k = v + k   pk  
t
4n
;
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and (  1
n
Pn
j=1 j)
k  t
 
n 1X
j=1
n  2j
n
tk+j  
nX
j=1
 
j   
2!
satises 2k   k+1   k 1 = t (k+1   k 1).
Thus interpreting the term v+k as an asymmetric surplus parameter al-
lows us to map this model with asymmetric locations into to the two previous
models with symmetric locations but asymmetric benets.
We will now show inductively how and when this mapping can be inverted
to a mapping of a model of asymmetric benets to asymmetric locations.
First take odd n  3, let 1 = 0,7 and k = k 2 +
 
2k   k+1   k 1

=t for
all k = 3; :::; 2n+1 (intuitively, the k are determined in two rotations around
the circle). It is easy to see that this set of indices covers all of k = 1; :::; n
once and implies a specic value for 2n+1 which must be equal to 1:
2n+1 =
1
t
nX
i=1
 
22i+1   2i+2   2i

=
1
t
 
nX
i=1
2i  
nX
i=1
i  
nX
i=1
i
!
= 0:
Thus for odd n the asymmetric location model maps directly back into an
asymmetric benet model.
We will now see that for even n  2 the situation is slightly more com-
plicated. A rst observation is that since the condition determining the
k only involves the term (k+1   k 1), the k with even and odd indices
are determined independently of each other, since already after one rota-
tion we reach the k we started with. Thus we dene 1 = 2 = 0,8 let
k = k 2+
 
2k   k+1   k 1

=t for all i = 3; :::; n+2, and in the end need
to verify the conditions n+1 = 1 and n+2 = 2. We have
n+1 =
1
t
n=2X
i=1
 
22i+1   2i+2   2i

=
2
t
 X
j odd
j  
X
i even
i
!
:
Thus for n+1 = 1 to hold we must haveX
j odd
j  
X
i even
i = 0 (3)
7This starting value is actually arbitrary and has no e¤ect on demand and consumer
surplus.
8Again, 1 could have any value, and 2 could di¤er from 1. This latter di¤erence must
be small enough, however, so that consumers still choose between their two neighboring
rms.
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(the same condition follows from n+2 = 2). This means that for even n
the asymmetric location model can be mapped into the asymmetric benet
model if and only if condition (3) holds.
From the previous discussion follows:
Proposition 4 For odd n  3, the asymmetric location Salop model is equiv-
alent to the asymmetric benet Salop model, while for even n  2 the asym-
metric location Salop model is only equivalent to the asymmetric benet Salop
model if condition (3) holds.
In other words, for even n the asymmetric benet model has one more
degree of freedom and thus allows for slightly less restrictive demand patterns.
This is easily shown for n = 2: In this case the values of 1 and 2 have no
inuence on demand (remember that the index 0 is identied with n = 2):
q1 =
1
n
+
2   0
2
+
2v1   v0   v2
2t
=
1
n
+
p2   p1
t
;
on the other hand, with asymmetric xed benets we obtain
q1 =
1
n
+
2wk   wk+1   wk 1
2t
=
1
n
+
1   2
t
+
p2   p1
2t
:
Thus with asymmetric benets there is scope for one additional asymmetry
in market shares.
Our formulation of consumer surplus makes it easy to show that also in
the case of asymmetric locations Roys lemma applies:
 @CS
@pk
=
1
n
+
2k   k+1   k 1
2t
+
2vk   vk+1   vk 1
2t
=
1
n
+
k+1   k 1
2
+
2vk   vk+1   vk 1
2t
= qk;
so as before aggregate demand in this model can be derived from the utility-
maximizing choice of a representative consumer.
3.4 Non-Equivalence with Quadratic Transport Cost
and Asymmetric Locations
Here we point out that if one joins the assumptions of quadratic transport
cost and asymmetric locations then one obtains a model that is not equivalent
to those discussed above. Thus the equivalence results from above are non-
trivial in the sense that it is easy to nd a model, using the same assumptions,
that is di¤erent at a fundamental level.
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We adopt the notation of the previous sections, so that the indi¤erent
consumer now is dened by
vk    (xk   k)2 = vk+1   

1
n
+ k+1   xk
2
;
or, with  = nt,
xk =
1
2n
+
k+1 + k
2
+
vk   vk+1
2t (1 + n (k+1   k)) :
Demand becomes
qk = xk +

1
n
  xk 1

=
1
n
+
k+1 + k 1
2
+
vk   vk+1
2t (1 + n (k+1   k)) +
vk   vk 1
2t (1 + n (k   k 1)) :
The latter expression reveals a fundamental di¤erence from the above three
models: The slope of demand with respect to the price of rm k and its
neighbors depends directly on the location parameters, while in the previous
three models these slopes were all constant with absolute value 1=2t. Thus in
the present model demand elasticity depends directly on the relative location
of rms.
A variant of this model, with three rms and only one degree of free-
dom in locations, has appeared in Brito and Pereira (2010). Our treatment
shows that this model is not equivalent to formulations of the Salop model
with either symmetric locations or linear transport cost, which implies that
predictions derived from these models can di¤er.
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Appendix: Omitted Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1:
In the following we transform the expression (2) of Salop consumer surplus
in various steps. First we need to simplify the transport cost terms (remember
the naming convention that indices k outside the range 1; :::; n are mapped
back into it in the obvious manner):
CS =
nX
k=1
 
wkqk  
Z xk
0
txdx 
Z 1=n xk 1
0
txdx
!
=
nX
k=1
 
wkqk   t
2
x2k  
t
2

1
n
  xk 1
2!
=
nX
k=1
 
wk
n
+
w2k   wkwk+1
t
  t
2

1
2n
+
wk   wk+1
2t
2
  t
2

1
2n
+
wk+1   wk
2t
2!
=
nX
k=1

wk
n
  t
4n2
+
3
4t
w2k  
1
2t
wkwk+1   1
4t
w2k+1

=
nX
k=1
wk   t=4n
n
+
nX
k=1
(wk   wk+1)2
4t
Note that in the last step we freely used
Pn
k=1w
2
k =
Pn
k=1w
2
k+1. Letting
sk = wk   t=4n then leads to the result in the Proposition.
Proof of Proposition 2:
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We now simplify the expressions for consumer surplus under quadratic
transport cost, shifting terms containing k   1 to k:
CS =
nX
k=1
 
wkqk  
Z xk
0
x2dx 
Z 1=n xk 1
0
x2dx
!
=
nX
k=1
 
wkqk   nt
3
x3k  
nt
3

1
n
  xk 1
3!
=
nX
k=1
 
wk
n
+
w2k   wkwk+1
t
  nt
3

1
2n
+
wk   wk+1
2t
3
 nt
3

1
2n
+
wk+1   wk
2t
3!
=
nX
k=1

wk
n
  t
12n2
+
3
4t
w2k  
1
2t
wkwk+1   1
4t
w2k+1

=
nX
k=1
wk   t=12n
n
+
nX
k=1
(wk   wk+1)2
4t
Thus dening ~sk = wk   t12n = wk   12n2 leads to the above result.
Proof of Proposition 3:
Consumer surplus can be reformulated as, again shifting the last term:
CS =
nX
k=1
 
vkqk  
Z xk
k
t (x  k) dx 
Z 1=n xk 1
 k
t (x+ k) dx
!
=
nX
k=1
 
vkqk   t
2
(xk   k)2   t
2

1
n
  xk + k+1
2!
=
nX
k=1

vk
n
+ vk

k+1   k 1
2
+
2vk   vk 1   vk+1
2t

  t
2

1
2n
+
k + k+1
2
+
vk   vk+1
2t
  k
2
  t
2

1
n
 

1
2n
+
k + k+1
2
+
vk   vk+1
2t

+ k+1
2!
=
nX
k=1

vk
n
  t
4n2
+
1
2t

v2k   vkvk+1 + (tk+1   tk 1) vk  
1
2
(tk   tk+1)2

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Writing s^k = vk + k   t4n for as-yet-to-be determined terms k, we obtain
CS =
nX
k=1
 
s^k
n
+
(s^k   s^k+1)2
4t
!
=
nX
k=1

vk
n
  t
4n2
+
k
n
+
1
2t

v2k   vkvk+1 +
 
2k   k+1   k 1

vk +
1
2
 
k   k+1
2
:
Matching the coe¢ cients on the vk and the constant, we obtain the conditions
2k   k+1   k 1 = tk+1   tk 1 8 k 2 f1; :::; ng ;
nX
k=1

k
n
+
1
4t
 
k   k+1
2
=   1
4t
nX
k=1
(tk   tk+1)2
It is straightforward (though cumbersome) to verify that the solutions to the
rst set of conditions are given by
k =
n 1X
j=1
n  2j
n
tk+j +K + Ck;
for some constants K;C 2 R.9 First, the identication of index k with index
k + n implies that C = 0. We now determine the constant K from the
remaining condition. From the expression for k it follows that k   k+1 =
tk+1 + tk   2t, where   1n
Pn
j=1 j, and
nX
k=1
k
n
= K +
n 1X
j=1
n  2j
n
t = K:
Then we obtain, shifting indices from k + 1 to k in the last step,
K =   1
4t
nX
k=1
 
k   k+1
2
+ (tk   tk+1)2

=  t
nX
k=1
 
k   
2
:
Thus the nal expression for k becomes
k = t
 
n 1X
j=1
n  2j
n
tk+j  
nX
j=1
 
j   
2!
:
9The roots of the characteristic equation of this second-degree di¤erence equation are
both equal to 1, so this is indeed the general solution.
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